Khalid Chraibi: The Reform of the Islamic Calendar - Part 1

The issue of Islamic calendar comes up every year around the time of Ramadan and/or the two Eids. On Irtiqa Nidhal Guessoum had this post a little over a year ago: Islam and Astronomy: The tug-of-war continues and another one earlier this year: Important progress on the Islamic calendar problem. And then just a couple of months ago, I had a post about the confusion about Eid in Pakistan: Strife amongst  maulvis give astronomers a rare opening in Pakistan.

We have a guest post here on Irtiqa on this particular topic. It was originally published atTabsir.net, but it is being republished here with the permission of the author. I think it is an important issue and it is great to see progress being made in this direction (though it is only a matter of time when the dispute will only be about what astronomical marker to use rather than whether we should use calculations. And these discussions will pave the way for that).

Here is the first part of the article. Read part 2 of the article here.

The Reform of the Islamic Calendar: Part 1

by Khalid Chraibi

Shortcomings of the Islamic calendar

A calendar associates a specific date with each day of any given week, month or year, to enable people to manage all their activities over an extended period of time. They must be able to anticipate, plan and organize in advance, using the information provided by the calendar, everything that they need to do. But, in Muslim societies, people wait to see, each country for itself, the appearance of the new moon at the end of each lunar month, before they declare the beginning of a new lunar month. As a result:

- the information in the Islamic calendar does not extend beyond the current month;

- and the data it shows each month differs from one Muslim country to another.

For instance, the first day of Ramadan 1427 corresponded to Saturday, September 23, 2006 in 20 countries ; Sunday, September 24 in 46 countries ; and Monday, September 25 in 5 countries. (1) This situation is in no way unusual, but can be observed every month.

Because of these shortcomings, after the major Muslim countries were occupied by foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, Muslim people started using the Gregorian calendar to meet all their needs, and only care about determining Islamic dates on momentous Islamic religious occasions. 

But, to this day, they regularly get puzzled at the inability of the Islamic calendar to predict precisely, well in advance, the day on which major Islamic events such as the first day of Ramadan, or eid al-fitr, or eid al-adha, or the first day of the new Islamic year are to take place. They may even get annoyed because they cannot arrange in advance such ordinary things as taking a few days off from work on such occasions, making hotel bookings or flight reservations, or avoiding to take business or trip commitments on such dates.

The Islamic calendar only lost its usefulness when it got disconnected from its astronomical, conceptual and methodological moorings, early in the 7th century, based on Muslim theologians’ interpretation of a celebrated hadith of the Messenger on how to determine the first day of Ramadan. It could fulfill all the basic functions of a calendar, and meet all the needs of modern man, within the Muslim community, on a worldwide basis, if it were prepared using the applicable scientific concepts, methods and parameters developed in astronomy. 

Qadi Ahmad Shakir, President of the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shari’ah, explained in an important 1939 study of the issues that there was absolutely no obstacle, on the theological level, to the establishment of such an Islamic calendar, using astronomical calculations. (2) In 2004, jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi announced his full support to Shakir’s analysis and conclusions. (3) For its part, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), acting independently, presented in 2006 an ingenious, well thought-out methodology which permits the adoption of a pre-calculated calendar, while meeting all the traditional requirements of the Shari’ah (4).

Since then, a number of representative organizations of the Muslim communities in North America and Europe announced that they would henceforth use a calendar based on astronomical calculations to determine all the dates associated with the Islamic calendar, in substitution to the traditional method of observing the appearance of the new moon at the end of each lunar month to determine the first day of the following month. 

Astronomical considerations

The lunar calendar is based on a year of 12 months adding up to 354.37 days. Each lunar month begins at the time of the monthly “conjunction”, when the Moon is located on a straight line between the Earth and the Sun. The month is defined as the average duration of a rotation of the Moon around the Earth (29.53 days). From an astronomical point of view, lunar months do not have a duration of 30 days and 29 days in sequence. There are at times short series of 29 days and short series of 30 days, as illustrated by the following sequence of the duration of 24 lunar months in the period 2007-2008 : « 30, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 30, 29, 30, 30, 30, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 29, 30, 29, 30. » 

The astronomers set the convention, over two thousands years ago, that months of 30 days and 29 days would succeed each other, adding up over two successive months to 59 full days. This left only a small monthly variation of 44 minutes to account for, which added up to a total of 24 hours (i.e. the equivalent of one full day) in 2.73 years. To settle accounts, it was sufficient to add one day every three years to the lunar calendar, in the same way that one adds one day to the Gregorian calendar, every four years. The lunar calendar based on calculations can thus be established very precisely, on an annual basis, long in advance, with identical monthly data for the whole Earth. 

A calendar disconnected from its astronomical moorings

In pre-Islamic Arabia, the Bedouin were used to observing the position of the stars at night, to guide them in their travels through the desert, and to observe the appearance of the new moon to determine the beginning of months. When the Companions of the Messenger asked him about how they should determine the beginning and end of the month of fasting (Ramadan), he told them, in line with the well-established habits of the Arabs, to begin fasting with the appearance of the new moon ( the evening of 29th day of the month of Sha’baan) and to stop fasting with the appearance of the new moon (of the month Shawal). “If the crescent is not visible (due to clouds) count up to 30 days.”

However, the new moon typically becomes visible only some 17 hours after the “conjunction”, and only subject to the existence of favorable conditions including such factors as the site where the observation is carried out, the number of hours since the conjunction, the relative positions of the sun, the moon and the observer, the angle with the sun at sunset, the altitude of the moon at sunset, atmospheric conditions at the site of observation (pollution, humidity, air temperature, altitude), the detection limit of the human eye, etc … 

If the “conjunction” occurs early in the day, the new moon may be visible on the same evening, after sunset, in specific regions of Earth where the appropriate favorable observation conditions are met. From one month to the next, these favorable conditions exist in different areas of the globe. Otherwise, beginning with the second night after the “conjunction,” the new moon will be observed easily enough in many regions of Earth. Thus, various States and communities in the Muslim world often begin the new lunar month on different days, with a delay of 24 hours from each other during the 48 hours following the “conjunction”. 

Clearly, a calendar which depends on the observation of the new moon, at the end of each lunar month, to determine the beginning of the new month, cannot be of any use to plan activities beyond the current month.

Rigorous rules to reduce uncertainties and drifts

Early astronomers who converted to Islam (and in their wake Muslim jurists) knew that the length of the lunar month was between 29 days and 30 days, whether measured between two “conjunctions” or between two observations of the new moon, as the Messenger had emphasized in various hadiths. (5) As far as they were concerned, the beginning and duration of lunar months were independent of the presence or absence of observers and of the visibility conditions of the new moon in various Earth regions. The first sighting of the new moon anywhere on Earth set the beginning date of each lunar month for the whole Earth (and the duration of each month between two new moons was the same for all regions of Earth). 

But, though these principles were conceptually easy to understand, they were difficult to put into practice. Indeed, once the new moon had been reliably observed somewhere, how was this information to be brought to the attention of populations living over extended geographic areas, or even in very remote areas (as illustrated by the distance between Spain and Arabia, for example)? To which communities did such an information apply, as a rule of law, and they had to draw from it all its implications (such as to start fasting, or to celebrate the end of Ramadan, etc.)? 

Muslim theologians/jurists in the early days of Islam gave a wide range of practical answers to these difficult questions. One can draw from them a core of fundamental principles, which continue to be of great interest today:

(1) The observation of the new moon can be taken into account only by the communities which receive the information.

(2) The observation of the new moon in Eastern countries marks, from a theoretical standpoint, the beginning of the new month for all countries located to the west of the site of observation. This is so because, as the age of the new moon increases between the time of its birth (at the “conjunction”) and its first setting, the possibility of observing it improves. Thus, going from East to West, from Mecca to Casablanca, for example, the age of the new moon increases by 3 hours between the times of sunset in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.

(3) An observation of the new moon must be considered void, when reported before the conjunction has occurred.

(4) In general, given the difficulties of communication between Muslim communities over extended geographic settings, the population of each country must implement the decision of the national authorities concerning the beginning of lunar months.

Today, only the latter principle is scrupulously respected in the Muslim world. As a result, because of the multiplication of States and Muslim communities around the world, the same beginning of month is sometimes shelled out like a rosary in successive days in different countries. Thus, “Eid al Fitr,” corresponding to 1 Shawal 1429, was celebrated in 5 different days around the world: in 1 country on 29 September 2008, in 19 countries on September 30, in 25 countries on 1 October, in 5 countries on October 2, and 1 community on October 3.

Such a drift in the Muslim calendar is contrary to Reason. Nor, would it be possible if the first three principles outlined above were respected. This is the thesis developed in 1965 by Allal El Fassi, an ‘alim (jurist) of the University Qarawiyine of Fez (Morocco) and Moroccan Minister of Islamic Affairs, in a report on “the beginning of lunar months” he prepared at the request of King Hassan II. (6) According to him, if a consensus could be reached on the application in Muslim countries of the first three principles above, such a “return to the sources of Islamic law” could provide a strong basis and impetus for the unification of the dates of religious celebrations across the Muslim world. Thus, the first sighting of the new moon anywhere on Earth should be confirmed by the appropriate Muslim authorities at the site of observation and, using modern communication technologies, should be quickly brought to the attention of the competent authorities of all States and Muslim communities around the world. The latter would have the responsibility to spread the information in their respective territories. 

Diversified sets of rules to determine the beginning of lunar months

But, contrary to el Fassi’s recommendations, things became even more complicated as more independent States began specifying new rules and procedures to determine, each one for itself, the beginning of lunar months. Thus, Saudi Arabia bases itself on the monthly observation, by the naked eye, of the new moon to declare the beginning of months associated with religious celebrations (Ramadan, Eid al Fitr, Dhul Hijja, etc.). Specialized commissions have the responsibility, on such occasions, to search for the new moon in the sky. The High Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia bases itself on the result of their observations to determine the beginning of the new month. In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Oman, Morocco, Nigeria, Trinidad, etc.., the observation of the new moon must be certified by a qadi (judge) or an official specialized commission. In Egypt, the new month begins after conjunction, when the new moon sets at least 5 minutes after sunset.

In Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, the new month begins after the conjunction, when the age of the new moon is more than 8 h, the altitude <2 and="and" elongation="elongation"> 3 °. It begins in Turkey, after the conjunction, when the new moon forms an angle of at least 8 ° with the sun, at an altitude of at least 5 °. In Libya, under the former Gaddafi regime, the new month began when the conjunction occured before dawn (”fajr”), local time.

The study of specific cases shows, however, that there is a significant gap between the rules that the various States say they apply and what they do in practice.

Is it licit for Muslims to use a calendar based on calculations?

The Qur’an prohibits nowhere the use of astronomical calculations for the establishment of a pre-calculated calendar. The procedure is therefore perfectly and undisputably licit. Numerous theologians in the early years of Islam saw no contradiction between the Messenger’s teachings and the use of astronomical calculations to determine the beginnings of lunar months. (5) The dynasty of Fatimids in Egypt used a pre-calculated calendar over a period of two centuries, between the 10th and 12th centuries, before a change of political regime reactivated the procedure of observation of the new moon.

But the majority of Muslim theologians insist nowadays that, no matter what, one can’t go against the Messenger’s teachings. They interpret his recommendation concerning the observation of Ramadan’s new moon as if it were part of the fundamental Islamic dogma. It would be utterly wrong, in their view, to use a calendar based on the conjunction, because one would start fasting, end fasting, and celebrate all other important Islamic events about two days earlier than would be the case if the procedure of observation of the new moon were applied. 

The argument, however, is hardly convincing when confronted with the facts of the situation. Thus, “a study of 42 reports of sightings of the Ramaḍān new moon, as announced by the Supreme Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia (Majlis al-Qadā’ al-A‘lā) between 1962 to 2001 (1381 AH to 1422 AH), confirms that more than half of these were too early and based on false sightings (Kordi, 2003). Most of these false sightings were probably caused by a bright star or planet (such as Venus) or an airplane contrail viewed near to the western horizon.” (7)

The report of erroneous sightings is not peculiar to Saudi Arabia but is observed in most other Muslim countries studied. The authorities in these countries base themselves on such false sightings to announce the beginning or the end of the fast of Ramadan and other major religious celebrations, even when the reported sightings are in contradiction with the well-publicized astronomical facts of the situation. 

In any case, in the view of many Islamic thinkers, the Messenger’s recommendation to the faithful should not be confused with the acts of worship. It was merely adapted to the culture of the times. (6) One should also note that, during long periods of Islamic history, the hadithunder discussion was not interpreted to mean the visual observation of a new moon, but only the acquisition of information, according to credible sources, that the month had begun. Thus, one doesn’t have to see the new moon for himself in order to start the fast of Ramadan. He merely needs to learn of the event from credible sources, such as the local authorities. This opens entirely different vistas in the discussion of this question. (6)

As for the hadith of the Messenger according to which the Bedouins can neither write nor count, and must thus avoid using (astronomical) calculations, Ibn Taymiya observes that the argument may have been justified at the beginning of the 7th century, but he questions whether it could still apply to Muslims centuries later, after they had been at the vanguard of development of scientific knowledge, including in the field of astronomy.

The Saudi authorities hold a dual position on this subject. They say they rely exclusively on the sighting of the new moon to determine the dates of all religious celebrations. But they use the Umm al Qura calendar (which is prepared based on calculations) to manage all year-long the administrative and budgetary affairs of the country. (7) Sheikh Abdul Muhsen Al-Obaikan, a Councilor in the Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, is clearly favourable to the use of modern technology to determine the beginning of months. He says “Using the naked eye to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan is primitive in an age of modern science and technology. There is no other way to put it. It’s pure backwardness.” (8)

Parts of the essay appeared on SaudiDebate.com (5 September 2007) and Tabsir.net (23 July 2008). I wish to express my deep appreciation to Ms. Rachida Benchemsi and Messrs Said Branine, Mark Huband, Daniel Martin Varisco and Khalid Shaukat. Any errors of fact or interpretation are solely mine.

Read part 2 of the article here.

(1) http://www.moonsighting.com/1427rmd.html

(2) Ahmad Shakir: « The beginning of arab months … is it legal to determine it using astronomical calculations? ». (published in arabic in 1939) reproduced in the arab daily « al-madina », 13 october 2006 (n° 15878):
http://ahmadmuhammadshakir.blogspot.com/ 

(3) Yusuf al-Qaradawi: « Astronomical calculations and determination of the beginning of months » (in arabic) : http://www.scribd.com/doc/102861247/Qaradawi-Astronomical-Calculations-and-the-Islamic-Calendar-in-Arabic

(4) Fiqh Council of North America: http://www.moonsighting.com/calendar.html

(5) Abderrahman al-Haj: “The faqih, the politician and the determination of lunar months ” (in Arabic):
http://www.scribd.com/doc/102861233/al-Haj-Le-theologien-le-politicien-et-le-debut-des-mois-lunaires-10-10-2004 

(6) Allal el Fassi: “Al-jawab assahih wannass-hi al-khaliss ‘an nazilati fas wama yata’allaqo bimabda-i acchouhouri al-islamiyati al-arabiyah” (The true answer […] concerning the beginning of Islamic Arabic months), report prepared at the request of King Hassan II of Morocco, Rabat, 1965 (36 p.), with no indication of editor

(7) Robert Harry Van Gent: “The Umm-al-Qura calendar of Saudi Arabia”http://www.staff.science.uu.nl/~gent0113/islam/ummalqura.htm 

(8) Anver Saad: “The Untold Story of Ramadhan Moon Sighting” Daily Muslims, October 07, 2005 : http://www.scribd.com/doc/102861269/Saad-Untold-Story-of-Ramadhan-Moon-Sighting-Oct-07-2005

Sujeto, capitalismo y Primavera Árabe

La valoración y la reconstrucción de la historia ha sido una de las herramientas clave para entender los problemas actuales de los pueblos y ayudar a desmitificar “verdades dadas” y estereotipos que marcan, definen y, en muchos otros casos, anulan a los sujetos de una sociedad.

En los círculos de las humanidades en general, y en los estudios culturales en particular, hay un consenso que señala al capitalismo salvaje como el principal agente de la exclusión y la crisis social en la que nos encontramos, así como el principal motor de la desubjetivización del individuo que comenzó en los años ochenta con lo que Jaques Lacan denominó “la transformación de una sociedad en una sociedad sin Sujeto”, que no ha implicado otra cosa más que la deshumanización de la persona y la reducción de su deseo de creatividad ante un proceso totalizador que prepara su propio modo de subjetivación social a través de la imposición de su propio objeto de deseo, esto es, el consumo.

Y mientras este proceso funciona articulado con un discurso sobre la libertad de elección y la autonomía individual, se puede decir que, de hecho, el capitalismo ha usado nuestra libertad de elección como fetiche que ha convertido al Sujeto en un Sujeto engañado en el sentido que los objetos de consumo que se venden en cada esquina de las grandes ciudades se proponen como causa de deseo, cuando en realidad, lo que causa el deseo es el vacío del objeto, su ausencia.

Y ciertamente, por más de doscientos años, el colonialismo europeo introdujo las raíces de este sistema a Oriente Medio no solo a través de formaciones económicas que fueron haciendo del Sujeto social un súbdito del sistema, sino también a través de formaciones ideológicas post coloniales tales como el socialismo, el nacionalismo o el islamismo radical, aparentemente creados para el combate de la opresión de los poderosos y los dueños de ese capitalismo salvaje y excluyente, del cual no solo los gobernantes y sus líderes eran partidarios sino también agentes de repetición.

Se creó así una (in) diferencia en un sistema binario entre lo que se llamó Occidente y los demás, The West and the Rest, donde se deshumanizó al Sujeto y, en palabras de Hamid Dabashi "todo lo no-occidental se colocó fuera de los tropos de la metafísica europea evitando que el resto nunca estuviera en el ámbito de la sujeción plena o dentro de la misma agencia histórica de su realidad".

Para que un Sujeto se mantenga como Sujeto o reivindique su condición de Sujeto, su palabra debe permanecer activa y vigente mientras su capacidad de creatividad debe persistir y explotarse. Su lenguaje y sus manifestaciones artísticas y estéticas deben reconstruirse frecuentemente con respecto al otro y se debe responder a su voluntad y no la de aquel que le ha convertido en un mero objeto del sistema que lo ha disciplinado a tal grado de medirlo en parámetros cuantificables totalizadores más que cualitativos complementarios.

Un ejemplo de la reivindicación del Sujeto se tiene en la denominada Primavera Árabe. La característica común que las revoluciones árabes tienen con la sociedad global es que ambas se enfrentan al mismo problema, la crisis del capitalismo. No se trata de la crisis del Sujeto sino del sistema mismo. El Sujeto no aguanta el peso del sistema y sus residuos, pues ahora el Sujeto es el espacio a colonizar por el capitalismo volviendo a las personas códigos, números y consumidores de deseos creados que en lugar de crear Sujetos satisfechos originan los llamados “expulsados”, los desempleados, los humillados, los migrantes, los desposeídos, los no Sujetos.

Dentro de esta Sociedad diluida por el capitalismo, la voz de la Primavera Árabe ha sido de las primeras en levantarse y en tratar de reivindicar su condición de Sujeto mediante la resonancia de su lenguaje contestatario, un lenguaje que ha influido, con resultados a la espera, en otros lenguajes contestatarios a través del mundo tales como “los indignados” en Europa, “el movimiento del 99%” en Estados Unidos, o el slogan “estoy hasta la madre” en México, entre muchos otros que se están gestando justo ahora.

No se debe olvidar que el Sujeto no es un ser propiamente lógico, sino también pasional. La persona se constituye sobre un fondo delirante, es una forma de ordenar una entropía inicial, hecha de todos los estímulos que al azar invaden nuestra mente desde el principio. La actividad racional no resulta, así, ser un fin, sino un medio para satisfacer las pasiones o para moderar las pasiones que pueden dañar a la sociedad. Ese es el principio sobre el que se basa este texto, sobre la experiencia de los Sujetos iraníes y estadounidenses que han intentado ordenar sus pasiones para hacer frente al discurso proveniente de los dueños del poder que les han minado del derecho de hacerlo mediante la coerción, el secuestro de la memoria histórica y el uso de la violencia física y epistemológica.

La presencia geopolítica iraní en el Mar Rojo

Siguiendo la estrategia de ampliar el horizonte de sus austeras fuerzas navales, Irán ha anunciado el despliegue de su flota número 22 en las aguas estratégicas del Puerto Digna, al norte de Sudán. 

Esta maniobra militar que navega con el discurso de "llevar la paz a aquella región víctima de la piratería marítima", viene a complementar la serie de movimientos implementados en el Mar Rojo desde febrero de 2011 cuando Irán mandó fragatas y destroyers a Djibuti, el Golfo de Aden, y un par de barcos por el Canal de Suez bajo la entonces supervisión de las fuerzas militares egipcias, no sin antes haber parado en el Puerto de Yedda como un gesto de transparencia disuasiva con sus vecinos árabes del Golfo.

Pero ahora, la llegada de la marina iraní al Mar Rojo a través de los puertos de Sudán se ha anunciado tras el ataque israelí a una fábrica de armamento en una base militar en Jartoum, por lo que es muy probable que Irán esté buscando terreno fértil para maniobras y ejercicios asimétricos disuasivos en una zona poco explotada por Israel y aprovechada por Irán en los últimos dos años.

La zona del Mar Rojo comienza a ser una herramienta disuasiva  que Irán quiere explotar tras la reconfiguración geopolítica que, hasta este momento, ha planteado la denominada primavera árabe. 

Si bien la cooperación de Irán con Sudán data de más de una década atrás cuando ambas naciones firmaron cerca de 30 acuerdos comerciales para agilizar su relación económica, Sudán ha cofirmado su apoyo al programa nuclear iraní y mantiene su venta de uranio que comenzó en 2006, mientras el gobierno de Ahmadineyad sigue adelante con su compromiso de echar a andar un proyecto de tratamiento de agua potable en el Nilo sureño, principal preocupación estratégica de Sudán actualmente.

Y ciertamente los rumores sobre el bombardeo a la fábrica militar de Sudán hablan sobre un punto de fabricación de drones financiada por Irán, cuyas autoridades hoy en día se jactan de "tener en su poder fotografías de bases secretas israelíes obtenidas con base en aquella tecnología". Pero si bien el ataque ha acontecido de tal manera que no ha habido condena internacional  alguna en tanto Israel no niega ni confirma dichos ataques, los iraníes se han limitado a señalar "la violación de la soberanía sudanesa" sin echar a andar una respuesta militar mínima, lo que demuestra que Teherán no quiere una guerra directamente en estos momentos y se reserva el hecho de aumentar su presencia disuasiva  en la zona afectada como el más útil de los mecanismos de defensa hasta ahora.

Lo que es verdad es que la retórica y las herramientas disuasivas de ambas naciones han alcanzado Sudán y el Cuerno de África, una zonza geopolítica donde las bases estadounidenses e israelíes no tienen mucha presencia y, por el contrario, tienen pésimas experiencias con operaciones de "ayuda humanitaria" que han terminado en verdaderas catástrofes por el desconocimiento de la profunda crisis social de esa zona, tal como lo recuerdan los episodios de Somalia en 1993 cuando los marinos estadounidenses fueron recibidos con arma en mano por la población que, al atrapar a los miembros de la misión, arrastró a 13 soldados por las calles de Mogadiscio como muestra de repugnancia a la presencia extranjera en su territorio.

Las presencias militares iraní, estadounidense e israelí en la zona desequilibrarán aún más las fuerzas que han hecho de esta región un polvorín y un caldo de cultivo para operaciones asimétricas, lo que otorga una conclusión tajante que invita a decir que la crisis del Cuerno de África no es por la sequía sino por la intervención del oportunismo y el imperialismo extranjeros.

Argo y el Neo-orientalismo delirante

Argo, la nueva película de Hollywood protagonizada por Ben Affleck y producida por Warner Bros. Pictures y GK Films, narra la historia de seis estadounidenses que, con ayuda de la embajada canadiense en Teherán, lograron salir  de Irán en 1980 durante la llamada crisis de los rehenes.

Esta historia, que fue desclasificada por la presidencia de Clinton en 1997, de hecho no era tan secreta en la documentación anglosajona ya que, a penas los estadounidenses llegaron a Canadá procedentes de Teherán, su historia fue documentada por la cadena estadounidense PBS en 1980, la cual festejó su llegada a suelo canadiense mientras sus co-ciudadanos aún permanecían en Teherán. 

La crisis de los rehenes se documenta de noviembre de 1979 a enero de 1981, cuando una serie de organizaciones que habían participado en la revolución iraní tomaron la embajada estadounidense y secuestraron a 60 ciudadanos  para reclamar a Washington la deportación del Shah de Irán y juzgarlo por los nuevos tribunales revolucionarios.

Pero lo preocupante de este filme no es la historia en sí, sino la violencia del lenguaje simbólico que se usa para presentar al "otro" ante la opinión pública. El uso del neo orientalismo, de un discurso visual que presenta a una sociedad iraní totalmente caótica y violenta, no contextualiza el origen de esta crisis ni la situación por la que pasaba el país asiático en esos momentos, y solo se limita a presentar esta histórica como un hecho heroico y necesario para el narrador de la historia.

La película ciertamente muestra asombrosos detalles sobre la manera de operación de los Pasdaran en cuestiones de seguridad, pero a decir verdad, esos detalles corresponden más a la actualidad que a la época de 1979 que se intenta recrear. De hecho, en 1979, los Guardianes de la Revolución no eran más que un cuerpo novato que cimentó sus bases organizacionales gracias a la guerra con Iraq y no tanto a la misma revolución, y que no llegó a ser la sofisticada organización que es ahora sino hasta la década presente y en convenio con otras fuerzas importantes como los miembros de los antiguos servicios de inteligencia (adiestrados por la CIA) y los religiosos revolucionarios.

Sin embargo, en el filme no hay un sentido del tiempo en estos detalles, y ciertamente se presenta a Irán y a sus autoridades con un tinte de "ciencia ficción histórica" que no hace más que develar una imagen falsa, errónea y exagerada no solo de las mismas autoridades sino también de toda la sociedad iraní. Ejemplo de esto es la representación del Gan bazaar de Teherán, un lugar que escenifica un espacio de caos y violencia más que un lugar de intercambio económico y cultural. 

La fotografía es increíble y la ambientación de la capital iraní fascinante. Pero la manera de narrar los episodios que humillaron a las autoridades estadounidenses en esos momentos es exagerada e icónica. No hay un momento particular en la película que muestre una posición de diálogo y negociación, y por el contrario, se muestra la clásica contradicción estadounidense en la que mientras se subestima al iraní y se confía en ganarle todas las partidas geopolíticas, al mismo tiempo no se le ataca frontalmente porque se teme a sus reacciones y se desconocen las dimensiones de sus estructuras reales de operación. Basta decir que al final de cuentas, la película ofrece una visión eficaz de la seguridad iraní en aeropuertos, calles, edificios gubernamentales y otras zonas regularmente difíciles de accesar por cualquiera que no pertenezca al gobierno.

La película es entretenida e intenta mostrar algunos detalles de la manera en que el espionaje suele moverse por Teherán. Muestra cómo los estadounidenses trataron de destruir los documentos de su embajada ante la llegada de las masas y cómo las autoridades en el Departamento de Estado planeaban nuevas formas de rescate a los rehenes, las cuales finalmente fracasaron por la pésima coordinación de sus fuerzas armadas que, en esos momentos, se encontraban saliendo del síndrome de Vietnam que golpeó sensibilidades profundas entre la sociedad estadounidense. Cabe señalar que gran parte de los documentos encontrados y reconstruidos por los iraníes en la embajada estadounidense, están disponibles online en una base de datos basiji de la Universidad Amir Kabir.

A pesar de que Estados Unidos e Irán no tienen relaciones diplomáticas directas desde este altercado, esta película es otra muestra de que las relaciones psicológicas entre uno y otro actor no se han roto y por el contrario siguen siendo el principal vehículo de conexión entre ambas naciones pese a las tensiones actuales. Lo lamentable, desde mi punto de vista, es que una vez más, sin la espina que recuerde la construcción del "árabe" después del 9/11/2001 y previo a la invasión de Iraq en 2003, la exportación de imágenes recreadas en la ficción, la confrontación y la satanización del "otro" llegan a las pantallas del público sin la más mínima consideración de toda una década de guerras e intervenciones extranjeras en Oriente Medio.

¿Qué significa la visita del Emir de Qatar a Gaza?

El martes 23 de Octubre pasado, el Emir de Qatar Sheik Hamad Bin Jalifa al-Thani hizo una visita histórica a Gaza que causó deleite entre los partidos políticos de Hamas y los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto, mientras que entre la élite política de Israel y del al-Fatah se experimentó sorpresa y escepticismo.

El hecho de que la política exterior qatarí haya llegado directamente a Gaza para irrumpir la influencia iraní en Hamas no significa una buena noticia para Israel y Estados Unidos. La visita del Emir a Gaza pone de manifiesto que este pequeño pero adinerado emirato tiene ideas marcadamente diferentes a las de Washington acerca de quién o quiénes serán los actores que definan el futuro de la región tras los acontecimientos de la Primavera Árabe.

Después de todo, Hamas siempre ha sido formalmente rechazada como un partido político por los Estados Unidos e Israel quienes, por el contrario, la han tachado de organización terrorista internacional mostrando renuencia al diálogo y evitando posiciones oficiales a favor de su reconciliación con al Fatah en Cisjordania. Así, el propósito del Emir qatarí en su entrevista con Ismail Haniyya, es hacer de Gaza un área de influencia junto con la hermandad musulmana en Egipto para asegurar políticas económicas y sociales favorables en el nuevo entorno geopolítico de la región.

Con esto, Hamad Bin Jalifa llegó a Gaza para inaugurar proyectos de inversión de 400 mil millones de dólares que serán usados en la reconstrucción de la infraestructura destrozada en repetidos enfrentamientos con Israel, lo cual se convierte en un enorme estímulo para una economía ahogada por un cerco de sanciones y aislamiento económico de cinco años impuesto por el régimen racista de Israel.

Hamas, mediante la figura de Ismail Haniya, aceptará la inversión qatarí (la cual fue descrita por Washington como una “acción humanitaria” para no ser cuestionado sobre el por qué Qatar, sede del CENTCOM en Oriente Medio, se entrevista con “terroristas” a los ojos de todo el mundo), poniendo en la mesa una probable agenda geopolítica para que dicho movimiento pueda tomar la opción de aliarse con los Hermanos Musulmanes en Egipto, los islamistas moderados en Turquía y aceptar totalmente el respaldo de las monarquías petroleras por el debilitamiento del eje Teherán-Damasco ante el escenario actual sirio. Cabe señalar que el Partido en el gobierno en Turquía también ha cortejado asiduamente a Hamas cuando el líder de la organización, JaledMeshal, fue recibido con los honores dados a un jefe de Estado cuando asistió ala convención anual del PJD el 29 de septiembre pasado.

Por tal motivo, la visita del Emir de Qatar es vista con cautela por los propios palestinos. El envío de armas a Siria no concuerda con la política pacifista que Qatar dice representar. Qatar tiene relaciones políticas y económicas directas con Israel, Estados Unidos e Irán, y a la vez patrocina movimientos islamistas en Libia, Siria y Egipto. Cabe señalar que la presencia del Emir qatarí se redujo a una reunión en la Universidad de Gaza cancelando la presentación masiva que se había agendado en el estadio nacional de fut bol  Mal‘ab Filastin con capacidad para 10 000personas, mostrando la distancia de la ciudadanía palestina a dicho evento.

Hasta estos momentos, Hamas había sido una especie de excepción para la organización de la Hermandad Musulmana, habiendo encontrado en sí un gran apoyo político, económico y militar en Irán y Siria. Así, la misión de Qatar será “atraer a Hamas de vuelta al redil árabe” y alejarla lo más que se pueda de la influencia iraní. En otras palabras, la visita del Emir de Qatar a Gaza puede ser vista como una recompensa a la organización por romper aparentemente los lazos con el régimen de al-Assad en una decisión que enfureció a Irán y que en su momento se trató de recomponer mediante una visita de Jaled Mishal a Teheránen noviembre de 2011.

La visita del emir de Qatar a Gaza es un síntoma de la voluntad qatarí de hacer más aliados políticos en la región más allá de control militar de Estados Unidos e Israel, y de la incapacidad de al Fatah para generar una nueva ruta de diálogo con sus propios ciudadanos y base social en Cisjordania. Si Qatar pretende aparecer como un moderador entre Hamas y al Fatah entonces hará sonar la billetera, esperando que los resultados no se tornen hostiles y le dé a cada actor lo que necesita para conseguir sus intereses nacionales: a Qatar le interesa un peso político importante en la región, a Irán la estabilidad financiera y la cooperación en la explotación de South Pars en el Golfo, a Israel la garantía de su existencia como Estado y la inmunidad de su potencial militar, a Estados Unidos la estabilidad petrolera y la nula influencia del modelo iraní en el creciente fértil, y a los palestinos, esperanza para conseguir el Estado tan prometido en las retóricas árabes. 

Basta saber si a caso ¿Estados Unidos y Teherán no moverán sus fichas para no perder el control de sus aliados regionales? o saber si a caso ¿Qatar puede comprar el liderazgo regional de Oriente Medio que tanto busca? Lo que es verdad es que el discurso qatarí en Gaza no concuerda con sus prácticas en política exterior, y que su falta de credibilidad entre la población palestina es tan alta como la falta de credibilidad en Mahmoud Abbas o en Hamas en conjunto y por separado.

This is not a Revolution

Now in Yahanestan we share this reflection titled "This is not a Revolution" written by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley in the website The New Yorker Review of Books. This is one of best texts I´ve read about the topic in many months; it ´s a bit long but widely recommended¡¡

A campaign event for Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s presidential candidate, Mansoura, Egypt, April 22, 2012. Morsi was declared the winner of the election on June 24.

Darkness descends upon the Arab world. Waste, death, and destruction attend a fight for a better life. Outsiders compete for influence and settle accounts. The peaceful demonstrations with which this began, the lofty values that inspired them, become distant memories. Elections are festive occasions where political visions are an afterthought. The only consistent program is religious and is stirred by the past. A scramble for power is unleashed, without clear rules, values, or endpoint. It will not stop with regime change or survival. History does not move forward. It slips sideways.

Games occur within games: battles against autocratic regimes, a Sunni–Shiite confessional clash, a regional power struggle, a newly minted cold war. Nations divide, minorities awaken, sensing a chance to step out of the state’s confining restrictions. The picture is blurred. These are but fleeting fragments of a landscape still coming into its own, with only scrappy hints of an ultimate destination. The changes that are now believed to be essential are liable to be disregarded as mere anecdotes on an extended journey.

New or newly invigorated actors rush to the fore: the ill-defined “street,” prompt to mobilize, just as quick to disband; young protesters, central activists during the uprising, roadkill in its wake. The Muslim Brothers yesterday dismissed by the West as dangerous extremists are now embraced and feted as sensible, businesslike pragmatists. The more traditionalist Salafis, once allergic to all forms of politics, are now eager to compete in elections. There are shadowy armed groups and militias of dubious allegiance and unknown benefactors as well as gangs, criminals, highwaymen, and kidnappers.

Alliances are topsy-turvy, defy logic, are unfamiliar and shifting. Theocratic regimes back secularists; tyrannies promote democracy; the US forms partnerships with Islamists; Islamists support Western military intervention. Arab nationalists side with regimes they have long combated; liberals side with Islamists with whom they then come to blows. Saudi Arabia backs secularists against the Muslim Brothers and Salafis against secularists. The US is allied with Iraq, which is allied with Iran, which supports the Syrian regime, which the US hopes to help topple. The US is also allied with Qatar, which subsidizes Hamas, and with Saudi Arabia, which funds the Salafis who inspire jihadists who kill Americans wherever they can.

In record time, Turkey evolved from having zero problems with its neighbors to nothing but problems with them. It has alienated Iran, angered Iraq, and had a row with Israel. It virtually is at war with Syria. Iraqi Kurds are now Ankara’s allies, even as it wages war against its own Kurds and even as its policies in Iraq and Syria embolden secessionist tendencies in Turkey itself.

For years, Iran opposed Arab regimes, cultivating ties with Islamists with whose religious outlook it felt it could make common cause. As soon as they take power, the Islamists seek to reassure their former Saudi and Western foes and distance themselves from Tehran despite Iran’s courting. The Iranian regime will feel obliged to diversify its alliances, reach out to non-Islamists who feel abandoned by the nascent order and appalled by the budding partnership between Islamists and the US. Iran has experience in such matters: for the past three decades, it has allied itself with secular Syria even as Damascus suppressed its Islamists.

When goals converge, motivations differ. The US cooperated with Gulf Arab monarchies and sheikhdoms in deposing Qaddafi yesterday and in opposing Assad today. It says it must be on the right side of history. Yet those regimes do not respect at home the rights they piously pursue abroad. Their purpose is neither democracy nor open societies. They are engaged in a struggle for regional domination. What, other than treasure, can proponents of a self-styled democratic uprising find in countries whose own system of governance is anathema to the democratic project they allegedly promote?

The new system of alliances hinges on too many false assumptions and masks too many deep incongruities. It is not healthy because it cannot be real. Something is wrong. Something is unnatural. It cannot end well.

A media war that started in Egypt reaches its zenith in Syria. Each side shows only its own, amplifies the numbers, disregards the rest. In Bahrain, the opposite is true. No matter how many opponents of the regime turn up, few take notice. It does not register on the attention scale. Not long ago, footage from Libya glorified motley fighters with colorful bandanas and triumphant spiel. The real battles, bloody and often from the skies, raged elsewhere. Casualties were invisible.

Throngs gather in Tahrir Square. The camera zooms in on protesters. What about the unseen millions who stayed at home? Did they rejoice at Mubarak’s overthrow or quietly lament his departure? How do Egyptians feel about the current disorder, unrest, economic collapse, and political uncertainty? In the elections that ensued, 50 percent did not vote. Of those who did, half voted for the representative of the old order. Who will look after those who lie on the other side of the right side of history?

Most Syrians fight neither to defend the regime nor to support the opposition. They are at the receiving end of this vicious confrontation, their wishes unnoticed, their voices unheard, their fates forgotten. The camera becomes an integral part of the unrest, a tool of mobilization, propaganda, and incitement. The military imbalance favors the old regimes but is often more than compensated for by the media imbalance that favors the new forces. The former Libyan regime had Qaddafi’s bizarre rhetoric; Assad’s Syria relies on its discredited state-run media. It’s hardly a contest. In the battle for public sympathy, in the age of news-laundering, the old orders never stood a chance.

In Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, no unifying figure of stature has emerged with the capacity to shape a new path. There is scant leadership. Where there is leadership, it tends to be by committee. Where there are committees, they emerge mysteriously to assume authority no one has granted them. More often than not, legitimacy is bestowed from abroad: the West provides respectability and exposure; Gulf Arab states supply resources and support; international organizations offer validity and succor.

Those in charge often lack the strength that comes from a clear and loyal domestic constituency; they need foreign approval and so they must be cautious, adjust their positions to what outsiders accept. Past revolutionary leaders were not driven by such considerations. For better or for worse, they were stubbornly independent and took pride in rebuffing foreign interference.

Not unlike the rulers they helped depose, Islamists placate the West. Not unlike those they replaced, who used the Islamists as scarecrows to keep the West by their side, the Muslim Brotherhood waves the specter of what might come next should it fail now: the Salafis who, for their part and not unlike the Brothers of yore, are torn between fealty to their traditions and the taste of power.

It’s a game of musical chairs. In Egypt, Salafis play the part once played by the Muslim Brotherhood; the Brotherhood plays the part once played by the Mubarak regime. In Palestine, Islamic Jihad is the new Hamas, firing rockets to embarrass Gaza’s rulers; Hamas, the new Fatah, claiming to be a resistance movement while clamping down on those who dare resist; Fatah, a version of the old Arab autocracies it once lambasted. How far off is the day when Salafis present themselves to the world as the preferable alternative to jihadists?

Egyptian politics are wedged between the triumphant mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, more hard-line Salafis, anxious non-Islamists, and remnants of the old order. As the victorious Brotherhood tries to reach an arrangement with the rest, the political future is a blur. The speed and elegance with which the new president, Mohamed Morsi, retired or sidelined the old military leaders and the quiet with which this daring move was greeted suggest that the Islamists’ confidence has grown, that they are willing to move at a faster pace.

Tunisia is a mixed tale. The transition has been largely peaceful; the an-Nahda party, which won the elections last October, offers a pragmatic, moderate face of Islamism. But its efforts to consolidate power are a source of nervousness. Mistrust between secularists and Islamists is growing; socioeconomic protests at times become violent. Salafis lurk in the wings, assailing symbols of modern society, free speech, and gender equality.

In Yemen, former president Saleh is out of power but not offstage. One war brews in the north, another in the south. Jihadists flex their muscles. The young revolutionaries who dreamed of a complete change can only watch as different factions of the same old elite rearrange the deck. Saudis, Iranians, and Qataris sponsor their own factions. Minor clashes could escalate into major confrontations. Meanwhile, US drones eliminate al-Qaeda operatives and whoever happens to be in their vicinity.

Day by day, the civil war in Syria takes on an uglier, more sectarian hue. The country has become an arena for a regional proxy war. The opposition is an eclectic assortment of Muslim Brothers, Salafis, peaceful protesters, armed militants, Kurds, soldiers who have defected, tribal elements, and foreign fighters. There is little that either the regime or the opposition won’t contemplate in their desperation to triumph. The state, society, and an ancient culture collapse. 

The conflict engulfs the region. The battle in Syria also is a battle for Iraq. Sunni Arab states have not accepted the loss of Baghdad to Shiites and, in their eyes, to Safavid Iranians. A Sunni takeover in Syria will revive their colleagues’ fortunes in Iraq. Militant Iraqi Sunnis are emboldened and al-Qaeda is revitalized. A war for Iraq’s reconquest will be joined by its neighbors. The region cares about Syria. It obsesses about Iraq.

Islamists in the region await the outcome in Syria. They do not wish to bite off more than they can chew. If patience is the Islamist first principle, consolidation of gains is the second. Should Syria fall, Jordan could be next. Its peculiar demography—a Palestinian majority ruled over by a trans-Jordanian minority—has been a boon to the regime: the two communities bear deep grievances against the Hashemite rulers yet distrust each other more. That could change in the face of the unifying power of Islam for which ethnicity, in theory at least, is of little consequence.

Weaker entities may follow. In northern Lebanon, Islamist and Salafi groups actively support the Syrian opposition, with whom they may have more in common than with Lebanese Shiites and Christians. From the outset a fragile contraption, Lebanon is pulled in competing directions: some would look to a new Sunni-dominated Syria with envy, perhaps a yearning to join. Others would look to it with fright and despair.

In Bahrain, a Sunni monarchy intent on retaining power and privilege violently suppresses the majority Shiites. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states come to their ally’s rescue. The West, so loud elsewhere, is mute. When Libya holds elections, Islamists do not fare well; their opponents believe they finally achieved their one victory in a country that has no tradition of political openness, lacks a state, and is sated with armed militias that regularly engage in deadly clashes. An octogenarian leadership in Saudi Arabia struggles with a looming transition, lives in fear of Iran and its own population, doles out cash to fend off dissatisfaction. How long can all this last?

In some countries, regimes will be toppled, in others they will survive. Forces that have been defeated are unlikely to have been crushed. They will regroup and try to fight back. The balance of power is not clear-cut. Victory does not necessarily strengthen the victor.

Those in power occupy the state, but it is an asset that might prove of limited value. Inherently weak and with meager legitimacy, Arab states tend to be viewed by their citizens with suspicion, extraneous bodies superimposed on more deeply rooted, familiar social structures with long, continuous histories. They enjoy neither the acceptability nor the authority of their counterparts elsewhere. Where uprisings occur, the ability of these states to function weakens further as their coercive power erodes.

To be in the seat of power need not mean to exercise power. In Lebanon, the pro-West March 14 coalition, invigorated while in opposition, was deflated after it formed the cabinet in 2005. Hezbollah has never been more on the defensive or enjoyed less moral authority than since it became the major force behind the government. Those out of power face fewer constraints. They have the luxury to denounce their rulers’ failings, the freedom that comes with the absence of responsibility. In a porous, polarized Middle East, they enjoy access to readily available outside support.

To be in charge, to operate along formal, official, state channels, can encumber as much as empower. Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 did not curb its influence; Damascus simply exerted it more surreptitiously, without public glare and accountability. Tomorrow, a similar pattern might hold in Syria itself. The regime’s collapse would be a significant blow to Iran and Hezbollah, but one can wonder how devastating. The day after such a long and violent conflict is more likely to witness chaos than stability, a scramble for power rather than a strong central government. Defeated and excluded political forces will seek help from any source and solicit foreign patrons regardless of their identity. To exploit disorder is a practice in which Iran and Hezbollah are far better versed than their foes. Without a Syrian regime whose interests they need to take into account and whose constraints they need to abide by, they might be able to act more freely.

The Muslim Brotherhood prevails. The newly elected Egyptian president comes from their ranks. They rule in Tunisia. They control Gaza. They have gained in Morocco. In Syria and Jordan too, their time might come.

The Muslim Brotherhood prevails: those are weighty and, not long ago, unthinkable, unutterable words. The Brothers survived eighty years in the underground and the trenches, hounded, tortured, and killed, forced to compromise and bide their time. The fight between Islamism and Arab nationalism has been long, tortuous, and bloody. Might the end be near?

World War I and the ensuing European imperial ascent halted four centuries of Islamic Ottoman rule. With fits and starts, the next century would be that of Arab nationalism. To many, this was an alien, unnatural, inauthentic Western import—a deviation that begged to be rectified. Forced to adjust their views, the Islamists acknowledged the confines of the nation-state and irreligious rule. But their targets remained the nationalist leaders and their disfigured successors.

Last year, they helped topple the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt, the pale successors of the original nationalists. The Islamists had more worthy and dangerous adversaries in mind. They struck at Ben Ali and Mubarak, but the founding fathers—Habib Bourguiba and Gamal Abdel Nasser—were in their sights. They reckon they have corrected history. They have revived the era of musulmans sans frontières.

What will all this mean? The Islamists are loath either to share power achieved at high cost or to squander gains so patiently acquired. They must balance among their own restive rank-and-file, a nervous larger society, and an undecided international community. The temptation to strike fast pulls in one direction; the desire to reassure tugs in another. In general, they will prefer to eschew coercion, awaken the people to their dormant Islamic nature rather than foist it upon them. They will try to do it all: rule, enact social transformations incrementally, and be true to themselves without becoming a menace to others.

The Islamists propose a bargain. In exchange for economic aid and political support, they will not threaten what they believe are core Western interests: regional stability, Israel, the fight against terror, energy flow. No danger to Western security. No commercial war. The showdown with the Jewish state can wait. The focus will be on the slow, steady shaping of Islamic societies. The US and Europe may voice concern, even indignation at such a domestic makeover. But they’ll get over it. Just as they got over the austere fundamentalism of Saudi Arabia. Bartering—as in, we’ll take care of your needs, let us take care of ours—Islamists feel, will do the trick. Looking at history, who can blame them?

Mubarak was toppled in part because he was viewed as excessively subservient to the West, yet the Islamists who succeed him might offer the West a sweeter because more sustainable deal. They think they can get away with what he could not. Stripped of his nationalist mantle, Mubarak had little to fall back on; he was a naked autocrat. The Muslim Brothers by comparison have a much broader program—moral, social, cultural. Islamists feel they can still follow their convictions, even if they are not faithfully anti-Western. They can moderate, dilute, defer.

Unlike the close allies of the West they have replaced, Islamists are heard calling for NATO military intervention in Libya yesterday, Syria today, wherever they entertain the hope to take over tomorrow. One can use the distant infidels, who will not stay around for long, to jettison local infidels, who have hounded them for decades. Rejection of foreign interference, once a centerpiece of the post-independence outlook, is no longer the order of the day. It is castigated as counterrevolutionary.

What the US sought to obtain over decades through meddling and imposition, it might now obtain via acquiescence: Arab regimes that will not challenge Western interests. Little wonder that many in the region are persuaded that America was complicit in the Islamists’ rise, a quiet partner in what has been happening.

Everywhere, Israel faces the rise of Islam, of militancy, of radicalism. Former allies are gone; erstwhile foes reign supreme. But the Islamists have different and broader objectives. They wish to promote their Islamic project, which means consolidating their rule where they can, refraining from alienating the West, and avoiding perilous and precocious clashes with Israel. In this scheme, the presence of a Jewish state is and will remain intolerable, but it is probably the last piece of a larger puzzle that may never be fully assembled.

The quest to establish an independent, sovereign Palestinian state was never at the heart of the Islamist project. Hamas, the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, harbors grander, less territorially confined but also less immediately achievable designs. Despite Hamas’s circumlocutions and notwithstanding its political evolution, it never truly deviated from its original view—the Jewish state is illegitimate and all the land of historic Palestine is inherently Islamic. If the current balance of power is not in your favor, wait and do what you can to take care of the disparity. The rest is tactics.

The Palestinian question has been the preserve of the Palestinian national movement. As of the late 1980s, its declared goal became a sovereign state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Alternatives, whether interim or temporary, have been flatly rejected. The Islamists’ plan may be more ambitious and grandiose but more flexible and elastic. For them, a diminutive, amputated state, hemmed in by Israel, dependent on its goodwill, predicated on its recognition, and entailing an end to the conflict, is not worth fighting for.

They can live with a range of transient arrangements: an interim agreement; a long-term truce, or hudna; a possible West Bank confederation with Jordan, with Gaza moving toward Egypt. All will advance the further Islamization of Palestinian society. All permit Hamas to turn to its social, cultural, and religious agenda, its true calling. All allow Hamas to maintain the conflict with Israel without having to wage it. None violates Hamas’s core tenets. It can put its ultimate goal on hold. Someday, the time for Palestine, for Jerusalem may come. Not now.

In the age of Arab Islamism, Israel may find Hamas’s purported intransigence more malleable than Fatah’s ostensible moderation. Israel fears the Islamic awakening. But the more immediate threat could be to the Palestinian national movement. There is no energy left in the independence project; associated with the old politics and long-worn-out leaderships, it has expended itself. Fatah and thePLO will have no place in the new world. The two-state solution is no one’s primary concern. It might expire not because of violence, settlements, or America’s inexpert role. It might perish of indifference.

An Islamist era that picks up where the Ottoman Empire left off, the shutting down of the nationalist interlude, is far from preordained. The Brotherhood flourished in opposition largely because it remained secretive, displayed patience, and ensured internal obedience. It built up influence through years of quiet labor and struggle. Once Islamists compete for power, many of their assets become obsolete. They must move openly because politics are more transparent, adjust quickly because of fast-paced change, and cope with diversity within their ranks because the system has become more plural.

Tunisia’s ruling Islamists must make a choice regarding Islam’s place in the new constitution; if they opt for a more moderate outcome, they will infuriate the Salafists, fail to reassure the non-Islamists, and befuddle countless of their own. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood faces attacks from secularists for injecting too much religion into public life and from Salafists for not injecting enough. Members split to join more moderate expressions of Islamism or more rigorous ones. The Brotherhood’s emphasis on free-market economics and the middle class does not play well to the underprivileged.

The new Islamist language, insofar as it emphasizes freedom, democracy, elections, and human rights, earns praise in the West but skepticism from critics. These might only be words but words can matter; they can take on a life of their own, force policy changes, make it difficult to renege. At that point, the Brotherhood can become the party it says it is, and then what will remain of its Islamism? Or it can persist as the movement it has been, and then what will remain of its pragmatism? Historically a tightly regimented transnational organization, the Brotherhood no longer speaks with one voice inside a country any more than it does across borders. As power beckons, each branch has different, often competing, political priorities and concerns.

Islamists also face the dilemmas of foreign policy. Egypt’s new assertiveness, its attempt at a more independent diplomacy, could put it at odds with the West. Its apparent decision to suspend its anti-Western and anti-Israeli positions risks alienating its public. Many Egyptians crave more than a Mubarak ornamented with Koranic verses.

Islamists prospered in opposition because they could blame others; they could suffer in power because others will blame them. Dilute their domestic and foreign agenda, and they may well lose their rank-and-file; pursue it and they will alienate non-Islamists and the West. Postpone the struggle against Israel, and their rhetoric will appear disconnected from their policy; wage it, and their policy will appear dangerous to their new allies in the West. If they explain that their moderation is tactical, they will expose themselves; stay silent and they will confuse the base. There are only so many contradictions they can simultaneously straddle in this Olympian balancing act. The power of political Islam flowed chiefly from not exercising it. Its recent successes could signal the eve of its decline. How much simpler was life on the other side.

Amid chaos and uncertainty, the Islamists alone offer a familiar, authentic vision for the future. They might fail or falter, but who will pick up the mantle? Liberal forces have a weak lineage, slim popular support, and hardly any organizational weight. Remnants of the old regime are familiar with the ways of power yet they seem drained and exhausted. If instability spreads, if economic distress deepens, they could benefit from a wave of nostalgia. But they face long odds, bereft of an argument other than that things used to be bad, but now are worse.

That leaves an assortment of nationalists, anti-imperialists, old-fashioned leftists, and Nasserites. Theirs was the sole legitimate ideology in the Arab world, invoked by those who fought colonialism and by those who replaced the colonial powers. Similar ideas have been invoked too, unwittingly but unmistakably, by the demonstrators and protesters of these past months who spoke of dignity, independence, and social justice, and thus borrowed from the same ideological lexicon as those they eventually ousted.

This non-Islamist, “progressive” outlook has roots, appeal, and foot soldiers; it lacks organization and resources and has suffered from having been so thoroughly tainted and corrupted by generations that ruled in its name. Can it reinvent itself? If the Muslim Brotherhood plays down people’s nationalist feelings, if it ignores their aspirations to social justice, if it fails to govern effectively, an opening might arise. The more nationalist, progressive worldview could yet stage a comeback.

A video makes the rounds. Nasser regales the crowd with the story of his encounter with the then head of the Muslim Brotherhood, who asks him to compel women to be veiled. The Egyptian leader replies: Does your daughter wear a veil? No. If you can’t control her, how do you expect me to control tens of millions of Egyptian women? He laughs and the crowd laughs with him. It is the early 1950s, over half a century ago. Today, one senses wistfulness for such humor and such bravado. History does not move forward.

Was the last century an aberrant deviation from the Arab world’s inherent Islamic trajectory? Is today’s Islamist rebirth a fleeting, anomalous throwback to a long-outmoded past? Which is the detour, which is the natural path?